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Weekly MoneyAnnouncements:
New Information and Its Effects
Richard G. Sheehan
HE consensus among economists is that mone-
tary policy has its primary effects over relatively long
time intervals — that is, quarters or-years rather than
days or weeks. Financial market participants, how-
ever, devote considerable attention to the weekly
money stock announcement, despite substantial
“noise” in the seties. Moreover, some economists
recently have “discovered” that an announcement of
an unexpectedly large money stock increase causes
interest rates and US, exchange rates to rise and stock
prices to fall.’
At first glance, the weekly impacts on financial mar-
kets may seem to contradict the consensus that
money has itsprimary effects over longer horizons. In
this paper, we show why money stock announce-
ments may have an impact on financial market vari-
ables on a daily or weekly basis even though the
principal effects of monetary policy are felt over sub-
stantially longer periods. The explanation for this ap-
parent contradiction is the adjustment of financial
markets to new information. The focus is on financial
markets since their adjustments to new information
tend to be more rapid than the adjustments of other
markets,’ The paper examines three hypotheses that
relate money stock surprises to financial market
prices, the relationships between these hypotheses
and the existing empirical evidence that attempts to
discriminate between the hypotheses.
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MONEE SAVECTiVHONS
Before examining the effects of money announce-
ments, one must begin with an obvious observation:
the money stock announcement itself does not create
money. It does, however, create new information
about the money stock, At the time of the announce-
ment, the level of the money stock to be announced
has already been determined. Thus, any response
resulting from the announcement is due to new infor-
mation r-atherthan new money. In the followinganaly-
sis, it will be important to distinguish between these
two,
Announcements about theweekly money stock typ-
ically are made on Thursday afternoons at 4:30 p.m.
ES’r; at this time the Federal Reserve Board releases
figures on the stock of money (Mu for the statement
week ending 10 days earlier.~Ifchanges in the money
stock itself have an immediate impact on financial
markets, that impact will begin to be felt almost two
weeks before the announcement when the money
stock itself changed,’
The evidence discussed below suggests that the
money stock announcements themselves appear to
RichardG. Sheehan is an economist atthe Federal Reserve Bankof
St Louis. Lany J. DiMariano and Michael L, Durbin provided re-
searchassistance,
‘Thatis, much ofthe week-to-week movements in the money stock
areunrelated to any economic phenomenon. See Pierce(1981).
‘For a sample of these results, see Cornell (1983b), Hardouvelis
(1984), and Urich and Wachtel (1984).
‘The standard assumption is that financial marker prices adjust
rapidlyto changes in their determinants,within aspan ofhours orat
most days, while prices in other markets tend, for a variety of
reasons, to adjust moreslowly. SeeFama (1982).
4lnformation also is released on the monetary base for the week
endingone day earlier,thecomponents of themoney stock and the
monetary base, and the aggregate portfolio of weekly reporting
banks.
‘The hypothesized short-run impact on interest rates of changes in
the money stock is termed the “liquidity effect.” For example, the
Federal Reserve may buy government securities and in so doing
provide currency and reserves. To convince economic agents to
part with the securities in exchange for money, the Federal Re-
serve’spurchase ofsecurities will bidthepriceof securities up, thus
biddingthe yield down. This liquidity effect occurs as soon as the
stock of money is increased. See Brown and Santoni (1983) for
evidence about the existence, magnitudeand duration ofthe liquid-
ityeffect.
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influence interest rates independent of anyeffect that
the actual money growth may have had. To explain
why the money announcements — which carry only
new information — may influence interest rates, one
must distinguish between expected and unexpected
money announcements.
Theoretical .5/jeets 0/EXpected and
I ~ Mona Announcenients
The money stock figures, when announced, are not
reported in a vacuum, Financial mar-ket participants
have substantial information on curr-ent and previous
interest t-ates and previous money announcements,
allowing them to form expectations about the likely
amount ofthe money stock to be announced. Current
asset prices are based in part on expected future
economic conditions, including future money stocks.
Observers generally believe that if financial mar-kets
are efficient, only the unexpected component of the
money stock announcement should influence finan-
cial variables. The expected component conveys infor-
mation already digested by the markets and incorpo-
rated in the prices and yields of financial assets.
Consequently, only surprises matter, notbecause they
provide new money, but because they provide new
information that may be useful in predicting policy-
makers’ actions and the behavior of both real and
nominal variables. The money stock announcement,
to theextent that it is expected, commonly is assumed
to have no impact on economic activity.’
THE ISO ACTS OF UNAN’FICIPATED
MONEY %\iOt~rt.i.5E1[:%~r1~c
There are a number of hypotheses about why
money surprises influence financial market variables.
The following sections compare three hypotheses and
their underlying assumptions. All three hypotheses
ar-c based on the assumption that financial markets
efficiently use all available infor-mation. Thus, cur-rent
interest rates, exchange rates and stock pr-ices r-efiect
the implications ofthe expected future money stocks.
The analysis of the alternative hypotheses is based
on the Fisher equation, which divides the current
nominal interest rate into the expected real retur’n
over- the holding period of the asset arid the relevant
anticipated r’ate of inflation. The money announce-
‘See Cornell (I983b) for an explicit statement of this assumption. It
should be noted, however, that more general models can be devel-
oped in which expected and unexpected announcementsare both
important. For example,see Belongiaand Sheehan (1 985b). These
more general models have not been widelyapplied.
ment can affect market rates of interest by altering
perceptions of the real rate of interest, expected in-
flation or both.
E0/;cctcd Liqnidltt l/JicI
Under this hypothesis, an unexpected change in the
money stock that moves it awayfrom its annual target
will be followed by changes in the opposite direction
to get money growth back on tar-get. The expected
liquidity effect, therefor-e, is based on the belief that
the Federal Reserve has credibility in pursuing its
objectives for the money stock. The expected liquidity
effect is based on financial market participants believ-
ing (1) that Federal Reserve policy is, at least in part,
adhering to a long-I-un monetary aggregate tar-get; (2)
that it will take thenecessary steps to achieve its target
over a relatively short time period; and (31 that such
actions will change interest rates.’
The impact of an unexpectedly large money stock
announcement based on the expected liquidity effect
is illustrated in figure 1.The cone formed by the solid
lines in figure 1 represents the Federal Reserve’s target
range for money gr-owth.” At any point in time, market
participants know past announced money stock levels
and have formed expectations about the futur-e path of
the money stock, given by the line ri’ in figure 1. ‘rhe
slope of this line represents financial markets’ expec-
tations of the money growth rate based on available
information, including some estimate of the Fed’s
desired short-run growth rate.”
‘Unexpected money deviations here refer exclusively to those as
seen by financial market participants. The money announcement
itself is assumed to reveal no information to the Federal Reserve.
See Urich(1982).
‘Whilethere maybeprofessional debateover theimpact ofmonetary
policy on the real interest rate, thereis general agreement among
economic textbooks that monetary policy does play a significant
role. Forexample, see Dornbusch and Fischer (1984).
‘Money growth in this and thefollowingsections refersexclusively to
Ml growth since data on the M2 and M3 monetary aggregates are
released only monthly. The Federal Reserve is required by Con-
gress to statetarget rangesfor all three monetaryaggregates.
“To focus on the expected liquidity effect and the impact of an
unexpected moneyshock, we temporarily abstractfromthe noisein
the series. In fact, the actual money stock numbers on a week-to-
week basisas initially released form a saw-toothed pattern with an
upward trend. In amore realistic setting, expected moneymay also
beexpected to fluctuatesubstantially asmarketparticipants attempt
to adlust their forecasts due to a host of changing economic and
institutional factors.
The mostcommon measure ofexpected money is the median ofa
survey of marketexpectations of money growth conducted weekly
by MoneyMarket Services, Inc. Atime series forecast is infrequently
used instead. Regressions of actual money changes on expected
money changes indicates that about 30 percent of all money
changes are expected. Thus, moneychanges havea large random
component, but are not entirely unpredictable.
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Erpected Liquidity Ellect
To focus on the expected liquidity effect, assume
that the money stock for the week announced previ-
ously was M,. Just before the money announcement,
interest rates, exchange rates and stock prices reflect
the assumption that M,, is the money stock to be
announced. Further assume that the announcement
of the money stock during week ti sthen made and
reveals that the money stock was, in fact, M,, rather
than M,,.
The expected liquidity effect assumes that financial
markets believe the Fed will adhere to its previous
policy and will take action to retur-n the money stock
to its expected path.” This tempor-an’ tightening may
begin even before the money announcement, since
the Fed develops estimates ofthe money stock before
its announcement. During this period1 higher-nominal
interest rates will be expected. Ifthe long-run growth
rate in the money stock is assumed to remain un-
changed, the rate of expected inflation should also
remain unchanged. Thus, short-term real interest
rates should rise as short-term nominal rates rise.
“The analysis in figure 1 is presented in termsof moneygrowth vis-a-
vis its expected growth rate. Alternately, it is possible that no
reaction (or a smaller reaction) would be expected until the money
stock went outside of the Fed’s stated target range. For example,
see Roley(1983).
Long-term rates will rise to the extent that they are an
average of the current short-term rate and expected
future rates.
The strength of the expected liquidity effect may
vary over time,’2 A deviation of announced from ex-
pected Mu will typically have alarger effect on interest
rates when market participants think the Fed is plac-
ing greater- emphasis on controlling Ml, Thus, the
expected liquidity effect should have been stronger
from October 1979 to September- 1982 when the Fed-
eral Reserve targeted on nonborrowed reserves as an
intermediate target,
It is not widely recognized that the expected liquid-
ity effect also makes an assumption about the perma-
nence of the shockunderlying the unexpected change
in money, assuming the Fed is not the cause of the
shock. If the cause is temporary — for example, a
winter snowstorm delaying check clearance—no Fed
intervention is r-equir-ed. When the disturbance is re-
moved, the stock ofmoney will return to its expected
growth path even without Federal Reserve interven-
Iru weeksl tion. A movement from M, to Md during week twill still
~ be expected to yield money stock M, in week t+k even
without Fed intervention. Thus, a positive shock per--
ceived as temporary will not result in expected mone-
tary tightening or higher interest rates. In contrast, if
the shock is perceived to be permanent, then discre-
tionary policy action will be required to return to the
expected path as discussed above.
Ifthe change is temporary but the adjustment back
to the expected path is slow, policy action may be
expected. For example, if delays in processing tax
refunds were an important but temporary factor in
lowering money growth, the Fed might act to offset
factors that would otherwise r’esult in a temporary
“For example, see Roley and Walsh (1984) and Gavin and Kara-
mouzis (1984). The most important institutional change was the
switch in the Federal Reserve’s operating procedures for conduct-
ing monetary policy. BeforeOctober 6, 1979, the Federal Reserve
primarily focused on interest rates in the short run, although there
were explicit monetary aggregate targets since 1975; see Wallich
and Keir (1979). From October 1979 through September 1982, to
improve monetary control, the Federal Reserve adopted a policy of
targeting on nonborrowed reserves in the short run. Since then, the
Federal Reserve has pursued amore flexible policy, paying some-
what more attention to interest rate fluctuations than it had in the
previous period, although not reverting to the pre-October 1979
regime. SeeWallich (1984) and Gilbert (1985).
Institutional changes since 1977 also include changes in the
money stockannouncementdate (switchedfromThursday to Friday
and back to Thursday), achange from laggedto contemporaneous
reserve requirements (in February 1984), and thechanges associ-
ated with financial deregulation. Any of these, in theory, could alter
the informational content of the moneystock announcement.
stetk
f-I t
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decline in the money stock. Thus, the expected liquid-
ityeffect is also predicated on the assumption that the
cause of an unexpected money change is permanent
(orof long enough dur’ation to pr’ompt an expectation
of Federal Reserve intervention).
:nt’<~~ocso :‘~ ~ t
The inflation premium hypothesis, like the ex-
pected liquidity hypothesis, focuses on market per-
ceptions of Federal Reserve behavior- in response to
money surprises. In sharp contrast to the expected
liquidity effect, this hypothesis assumes that the Fed-
eral Reservewill not react to offset unexpected money
fluctuations.
Againassume the Federal Reserve has atar-get range
for money growth givenbythe cone in figure 2,and the
dashed line represents expected money growth. The
last announced value of the money stock was M,, and
M~,is the level expected to be announced in the cur-
rent week. Also assume the actual announced value is
Md, yielding a positive money surprise of M,—M,,.
The inflation premium effect assumes that the sur-
prise will not be offsetbut that the money surprise will
induce (or is the result of) changes in the Federal
Reserve strategy toward less restrictive monetary pol-
icy. Thus, the money stock is not expected to return to
its former target path but is expected to move along a
new path as indicated by rig in figure 2. The slope of
this new path generally will be greater than that ofthe
previous expected path, which indicates higher ex-
pected money growth and thus higher expected in-
flation.” The inflation premium effect predicts that the
increase in expected inflation will lead to higher nomi-
nal interest rates for as long as this inflationary policy
is expected to last.
A crucial assumption underlying the inflation pre-
mium effect is that an increase in the money stock, at
least in part, signals an easier monetary policy
stance.” An unexpected increase in the money stock
“If the slope along ri-c is less thanthat along ru’, the two pathswill
ultimatelyconverge, as theyareassumed to do in the analysisof the
expected liquidity effect. Alternately, the growth path could have
exactly the sameslope, rii~ rif, before and after an unexpected
increase in the money stock. In this case, moneygrowthbefore and
after the one-week shock would be expected to be the same. The
long-run money growth ratewould increase only by the amount that
the one-weekincrease had an impacton theaverage. Since money
growth influences inflation only with a substantial lag and since a
one-shot level change in the money stock is generally small in
relation to, say, the year-to-year change in the money supply, a
simple step up in the level of the money stock would usually have
little effect on the actual orthe expected inflation rate.
‘4Again, this discussion assumesfinancial marketsbelieve the Fed is






announcement leads financial market participants to
revise upward their perceptions of expected future
money growth and expected inflation. What does this
assumption imply about financial market partici-
pants’ view of Federal Reserve policy? To the extent
that the Fed has stated monetary aggregate targets,
market participants must believe that those aggi-e-
gates may not be the sole target of policy.
The inflation premium effect, like the expected li-
quidity effect, also assumes that unexpected shocks
are perceived as permanent or only slowly self-
correcting. If the shock were perceived as temporary,
Fed intervention would be unnecessary, and money
growth would return to its original expected path
without Fed intervention.”
Aloor. tk-’nanc ti/ct t
A third hypothesis suggested as an explanation of
positive money surprises leading to interest rate in-
creases focuses on money demand effects,.“~‘Suppose
‘This statement also abstracts from considerations such as interest
rate smoothing. For example, atemporary shock may lead to Fed
interventionto smooth the adjustment to equilibrium. In addition, if
the shock weretemporary but tedtoa permanentshift in Fed policy,
it could also have the effect shown in figure 2.
“This effecthasalso beentitled the real economic activity effect. See
Cornell (1983b).
Mr
t—r t 0+4 t+k
(Is weeks)
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tual shift in the demand curve, subject to the limita-
tions noted above, would already have had its impact
felt before the announcement.’7
EPis~tirigtdshing.Bctjvocn the
./i.ltcrnat.ivc E/jëcts
The three effects described above all pr-edict that an
unexpected money stock increase will lead to higher
nominal short-term interest rates. In an effort to differ-
entiate the impacts ofthe expected liquidity effect,the
inflation premium effect and money demand effect,
some studies have examined the implications of the
alternative effects on stock prices and exchange
rates”
Based on the expected liquidity effect, some have
~‘ argued that, because the money surprise leads to
higher expected interest rates, it depresses the
present discounted value of future dividends, thus
lowering stock prices. tn addition, the expected li-
quidity effect predicts that, after taking into account
M:se~ exchange rate risk, higher expected real returns in the
United States relative to, say, Germany should induce
tutU a capital inflow that will be accompanied by a rising
value ofthe dollar vis-a-vis other currencies.
money demand depends in part on expected future
output, a situation considered by Fama (1982). Since
expectations about future output are unobservable,
financial market participants cannot determine aggre-
gate money demand. The money announcement then
conveys information not only about money demand
but also about expected future output. Anincrease in
money demand due to an increase in expected future
output is expected to persist and cause interest rates
tobe bid up. This effect is illustrated in figure 3, which
focuses directly on market perceptions of money sup-
plyand demand. While an increase in money demand
may lead market participants to also expect an in-
crease in money supply, it is assumed in this section
that only the money demand curve has shifted. The
case of money demand and supply both changing is
discussed below.
Before the money stock announcement, the ex-
pected future money supply and demand curves are
given by S and D, respectively. After an unexpectedly
large money announcement, the future money de-
mand curveis perceived to haveshifted (permanently)
from D to D’. Interest rates in the future are expected
torise toequilibrate themoney market, and the expec-
tations of higher future rates lead current rates to rise
in anticipation. Note that it is the new information
about the location of the present and expected future
demand curves that influences interest rates. Any ac-
The inflation premium effect predicts that anunex-
pected money stock increase will lower exchange
rates, as U.S. inflation increases relative to inflation in
other countries. The inflation premium effect makes
no prediction about the effect of an unexpected
money stock increase on stock prices?
“Ashift in moneydemand that is notdueto ashift in expected future
outputis not necessarilyassociatedwith any change in stockprices.
One particular money demand effect that is sometimes consid-
ered separately is thereserve settlementeffect. This effect existed
only under lagged reserve requirements when the timing of the
money announcement wassuch that it revealed information about
current reserve demand, Consider a money stock announcement,
say, on August 26, 1982. Data on the money stock was released
thenfortheweek endingAugust18. 1982. Butdepositsfortheweek
endingAugust26, 1982,determined requiredreserves forthe week
ending September2. 1982. Whenthe money stock numbers were
released, theymay havecontained incremental information on the
demandfor reserves.
An individual bank mayknow its own reserve requirements prior
to themoney announcement, but it has only limitedinformation on
aggregate reserves andthus on the federal fundsrate expected to
prevail for the remainder of the reserve settlement period. An
unexpected money increase generallyimpliesthat deposits, as well
asthe demand for requiredand total reserves, are all greater than
expected. The reservesettlement effect demonstrates how institu-
tional characteristics can influence the relationship, say, between
moneyannouncementsand interest rates.
IrFor example, see Cornell (1983b).
“See Cornell (1983b) for a moredetailedexplanation.
F,g,ne 3
Money Demand Effect
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tn contrast, the money demand effect implies that
an unexpectedly large money announcement will in-
crease stock prices due to the underlying increase in
expected future output. The international value ofthe
U.S. dollar may increase due to the direct impact ofan
increased money demand as wellas theindirect effect
ofgreater money demand leading to higher real inter-
est rates and resulting capital inflows?
coMv4~Hir~G THE IIYPOI.TIE-SES:
SUBST.fl.TJTES OH COMPLE.NIENTS?
Previous studies have advanced the three hypothe-
ses presented above as competing theories to explain
why unanticipated money announcements alter
financial market var~iables.zr In fact, the three effectsdo
not necessarily compete and maybe either substitutes
or complements. Consider asimple example inwhich
they are complements. As in figures 1 and 2, the
expected money stock prior to the announcement at
time t wasMb, while the announced value was Md.The
expected liquidity effect again predicts a slowing of
money growth from time t to t+ k. Assume that this
tightening is expected to be only partially successful.
In terms of figure 2, the money growth rate will be
between th’and rh~. In this scenario, nominal interest
rateswill be expected to rise due to both the expected
restrictive policy and higher expected inflation. Sim-
ply stated, monetary policy is expected to be tighter
afterthe unexpected increase, but not tight enough to
restore the former growth rate.
Figures 1 to 3 each focus on one monetary distur-
bance. There is, however, substantial noise in the
weekly Ml series. Thus, temporary shifts cannot read-
ily be distinguished from permanent shifts. Further-
more, in light of this uncertainty which all financial
market participants face, the Federal Reserve may be
expected to hedge its response to fluctuations.2’ Thus,
it is plausible that market participants may expect
monetary policy to be tighter after an unexpected
increase, but not tight enough to restore the former
growth rate.
Both the expected liquidity and the inflation pre-
~tt should be noted that the relationshipbetween real interest rates
and capitalinflows hasonly recently been emphasized. See Batten
and Ott(1983). Previouslytheemphasiswouldhavebeenplaced on
relationships likean expected expansionleading toa risein imports
anda drop in the U-S. exchange rate.
2’ln fact, Cornell (1983b) introduces an additional theory, the risk
premium hypothesis, based on increased monetary variability re-
quiring largerriskpremiums. Sinceneither henor Belongiaand KoIb
(1984) foundany evidenceof its existence, it is omittedhere.
~See Brainard (1967) for aformal model making this point.
mium effects are based on the assumption ofa perma-
nent money market shock that may prompt Federal
Reserve response. While such a shock need not origi-
nate in money demand, clearly it could. tfit does, then
the expected liquidity and inflation premium effects
cannot be distinguished from the money demand
effect.
Further complicating the analysis of the money
demand effect is that it presumes a shift in money
demand, but market participants are unlikely to be-
lieve money demand can shift without some Fed re-
sponse based on its presumed targets. Thus, the
money demand effect may imply, say, an expected
liquidity effect in response. For example, assume
money demand increases and the Federal Reserve is
believed to be focusing exclusively on a monetary
aggregate target. The increase in money demand, cc-
teds paribus, will lead to increases in both the money
stock and interest rates as figure a demonstrates. Fur-
thermore, the announcement of a money stock in-
crease could lead financial market participants to ex-
pect the Fed to reduce the money supply in order to
maintain its monetary aggregate target. This tighten-
ing, however, is the expected liquidity effect.
Alternately, if financial market participants believe
the Federal Reserve is trying to peg nominal interest
rates, theexpected Fed response to amoney demand
increase would bevery different. Anincrease in money
demand would prompt the Fed to increase the money
supply to prevent interest rates from increasing. In
this scenario, the unexpected money announcements
should have no effect on interest rates. Between the
extremes offocusing exclusively on interest rates and
focusing exclusivelyon amonetary aggregate, both the




The findings of previous empirical analyses of the
impact of anticipated and unanticipated money an-
nouncements are summarized in table 1. The results




Most studies conclude that short-term interest r’ates
are significantly and positively influenced by unantici-
pated money announcements. While this is true in
both the pre- and post-October 1979 periods, the ef-
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fects are substantially larger in the latter period!3 For
example, Judd (1984) finds that a 1 percent positive
money surprise would increase thethree-month Trea-
sury bill rate by only 8 basis points before October
1979, but by 38 basis points after September 1979!
That this is true is consistent with financial markets
believing that after September 1979 the Fed placed
substantially more weight on short-term money stock
movements in their efforts to achieve monetary aggre-
gate targets. Apparently, the market believed the Fed’s
statements that its procedures were being changed.
The very small estimated coefficients before October
1979 indicate that flnaxiciaj markets believed the Fed
was less interested in short-term movements in the
money stock before then,
That an unexpectedly large money announcement
increases short-term nominal interest rates cannot be
used as evidence to distinguish between the expected
liquidity, inflation premium and money demand ef-
fects, however. All three predict apositive relationship
between the two? Thus, previous research also has
z3There is alsosubstantiallygreater interestrate volatility in the latter
period. Inaddition, stndesthathave attemptedtoassessthe impact
of moneysurpriseshave beenfaced with the task ofsorting out the
influencesofother factorssuch asachange in theday ofthemoney
announcement, adiscount rate surcharge, credit controls, etc. See
also theinstitutional changes mentionedin footnote12. Most stud-
ies have simply chosen a period (or periods) for analysis and
assumedthat non-money-announcement effectswere unchanging
over that period. Whether this approach is valid is debatable. It
should be noted, however, that most estimated equations can
explain only 30 percent or less of the fluctuation in interest rates
around thetime ofthe moneyannouncement.
24ln general, no attempt is made here to present the magnitude of
estimated coefficients since the studies differ with respect to time
periods, definitions of the dependent variable (e.g., federal funds
rate vs. three-month Treasury bill as the short-term interest rate)
and equation specificatiort Inaddition, all the studies except Judd
(1984), Loeys (1984) and Gavin and Karamouzis (1984) make no
systematicstudy ofdifferential effectsoccurringafter October1982
when the Federal Reservedeemphasized the Ml monetaryaggre-
gate.
~ComelI(1983b) states:
The dramatic shift in the market response to money supply an-
nouncements after October 6 is difficultto reconcile with the expected
inflation hypothesis. If themoneysupply announcements areproviding
information aboutluture money growth, thereis no obvious reason why
the Fed’s stated intention to control monetary aggregates should induce
a positive correlation between announced innovations in money and
changes in interest rates- In fact, it is morereasonable to conclude that
the correlation would decline because week-to-week variation in the
aggre9ateswould no longer provide information about long-run policy.
Cornell’s argument is that theexpected liquidity effect predicts a
greater response to money surprises pre- vs. post-October 1979,
while the inflation premium effect predicts no change in response.
This lackof changewiththeinflationpremium hypothesis, however,
is basedon theassumption thatthechange in operatingprocedures
did not altermarket participants’view ofthe money supply process.
Theinflationpremium effect could alsobe associated withagreater
responsetoamoneysurpriseafterOctober197911, forexample, an
unexpectedincrease in the moneystock afterthat dateis viewed as
having a greater probability of signaling monetaryeasethan under
theprevious operating procedures.
focused on financial market variables for which the
responses to money surprises might differ.These vari-
ables include long-term interest rates, stock prices
and exchange rates.
Long~TernzInterest Rates
Studies that have considered the impact of money
announcements on long-term interest rates have been
unanimous in concluding that neither announcement
surprises nor anticipations influenced long-term rates
prior to October 1979. This is again consistent with
financial markets believing that the Federal Reserve
was pegging interest rates before October 1979. After
September 1979, with limited analysis there is some
evidence that expected announcements have no im-
pact on long-term rates. Expected increases in the
money stock may lead to higher inflation and higher
long-term interest rates, but do not necessarily lead to
higher inflation and interest rates immediately after
themoney announcement.
The results concerning announcement surprises
are mixed. Studies that have used long-term forward
rates such as Shiller, et. al. (1983), Hardouvelis (1984)
and Judd (1984) generally have found no significant
response? These findings are not consistent with the
inflation premium effect. A money surprise is appar-
ently expected to be quickly offsetby the Fed and thus
hasno effect on long-run inflation expectations. Alter-
nately, financial market participants could simply be-
lievethat weekly money announcements, froma long-
run perspective, convey little or no information useful
in forecasting long-term interest rates.
Studies such as Cornell (1983a) that have used
changes in actual long-term rates, which include the
effects of short-term rates, have found significant ef-
fects. Whether these effects are the result of market
participants’ short-run expectations about current or
prospective short-term interest rates or whether they
truly convey information about inflation expectations
has not been determined.
Stock Prices
Relatively few studies have considered the implica-
tions of money announcements on stock ptices Stod<
prices apparently decreased in response to positive
money surprises in the post-September 1979 period
In thepre-October 1979 period, there is no consensus
~Gavinand Karamouzis (1984)find the four-year forward ratethret
years ahead is significantly influenced by money surprises, whilE
the23-year forwardrate seven years ahead is not.
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on whether money surprises influenced stock prices
table fl. Expected changes had no effect on stock
prices in either period.
These results are inconsistent with the money de-
mand effect. Ifthe money announcement reveals an
increase in money demand due to an increase in
expected output, stock prices should increase.zT
.hxchange Rates
The exchange rate results presented in table I indi-
cate that neither anticipated announcements nor sur-
prises significantly influenced exchange rates before
October 1979. After September 1979, money surprises
have resulted in significant appreciation of the dollar
relative to some currencies, in particular the German
mark and theSwiss franc. Other exchange rates, such
as those relative to the British pound and the Cana-
dian dollar, have not appreciated significantly. To
date, there apparently have been no joint tests of the
significance ofmoney surprises on all exchange rates.
The evidence that exchange rates generally did not
depreciate is also inconsistent with the inflation pre-
mium effect. The inflation premium effect predicts
that an unexpectedly large money announcement,
associated with higher expected inflation, should lead
instead to lower exchange rates.2’
ShorCTerni Interest Rates
.tkipected Changes
Most studies also indicate that expected money
announcements had no impact on short-term interest
rates before October 1979.After then, table I indicates
a consensus that expected money announcements
had significant negative effects on short-term interest
rates. This result is inconsistent with any of the com-
peting theories and the efficient markets hypothesis.29
‘rhus, either the efficient markets hypothesis is incor-
rect, the theories as they are currently formulated or
tested are insufficiently detailed, or other factors are
changing that are correlated with expected money.
27This conclusion implies only that the moneydemand effect by itself
cannot explain all of the impacts ofthe moneyannouncements.
2’The exchange rate results imply only that the inflation premium
effectby itself is not capable of explaining all the impactsof money
announcements.
2sAfter October 1979, an expected increase in the money supply
would cause movement down the money demand curve with a
resulting decrease in interest rates, Market efficiency implies that
this decrease in interest rates would occur immediately upon the
change in expectations. Thus, if the money supply is expected to
increase prior to the money announcement, interest rates would
already have adjusted to this expectation prior to that an-
nouncement.
It is difficult to argue that the efficient markets
hypothesis is incorrect. If it were, it would imply that
profitable trading opportunities exist based only on
knowledge of expected money.3’ Given that the money
announcement is widely forecasted and both thefore-
casted and announced values are widely dissemi-
nated, it seemsunreasonable to expect profitable trad-
ing opportunities to remain for long. It seems more
plausible to attribute the significance of expected
money either to correlation between expected money
and omitted variables or to limitations in the underly-
ing theory!’
~i{~’i~1TSi()5S
While a number oftheories have been advanced to
explain why money stock announcements, particu-
larly the component that is unexpected, influence
financial market variables, this paper shows that these
theories arenot generally competing. Forexample, the
expected liquidity and inflation premium effects may
be complementary depending on financial market
participants’ perceptions of Federal Reserve goals.
Some empirical results are inconsistent with either
the inflation premium effect or the money demand
effect alone.The expected liquidity effect, by itself, can
explain theresponses ofinterest rates, exchange rates
and stock prices to unexpected money announce-
ments. Thereis no reason, however, to believe that this
effect, or either ofthe two others, operates in isolation.
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